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INTRODUCTION
This is an opinion article on the special
research topic now turned into an e-book
called “Decision-Making Experiments
under a Philosophical Analysis: Human
Choice as a Challenge for Neuroscience.”
As the first editor of the issue I want
to briefly comment on each of the arti-
cles highlighting its achievements and
prospects for the future.
THE ORIGINAL RESEARCH SECTION
INCLUDES 3 ARTICLES/CHAPTERS
To what extent a decision to deceive some-
one is conditioned by social pressure of
being caught in a lie and suffering the
consequences of it? This socially relevant
question is addressed in Sip et al. (2012).
Deception is a social conduct with prac-
tical interests and implications established
by complex interaction between interlocu-
tors or agents. Nevertheless, not many
empirical studies have been produced so
far to understand how the social pressure
is internalized by the subjects in their deci-
sions. Sip et al. (2012) explore, in a very
creative experimental design, social pres-
sure as a component of decision to deceive.
The study makes use of a computer game
in which the subject inside the scanner
could, in part of the trials, be confronted
by an opponent about his/her knowledge
of a display’s content. A small monetary
reward was used to encourage participants
to avoid being detected deceiving: Subjects
were rewarded for successful deception
and penalized for ineffective ventures.
The results, in addition to showing, as
expected, that the decision to deceive is
influenced by the risk of being detected
and the social confrontation represented
by the detection, also reveal that partic-
ipants were slower when taking an hon-
est course of action instead of taking
advantage of their privileged knowledge.
In trials in which confrontation was not
possible increased activity in subgenual
anterior cingulate cortex was recorded.
Also, understanding of a question which
allows a deceptive response was associ-
ated with activation in right caudate and
inferior frontal gyrus.
Deneve (2012) presents an elegant
Bayesian decision model that both infers
the probability of two different choices and
simultaneously estimates the reliability of
the sensory information on which this
choice is based. Trials in which the level
of difficulty is higher show early sensory
inputs having a stronger impact on the
decision. Accordingly, the threshold col-
lapses such that response time is shorter,
tough with lower accuracy. Easy trials, by
their turn, show the opposite: an increased
sensory weight and a higher threshold over
time, eliciting slower, but more accurate,
decisions. As the model advanced by the
author considers adaptive sensory weights,
it could not only extract a single estimate
from the sensory input, but also evalu-
ate the uncertainty associated with it. That
would be an advantage in comparison
to standard diffusion models as it would
allow an optimal combination with other
noisy sensory cues. The Bayesian model is
especially successful when it is possible to
encompass prior knowledge with sensory
evidence. Notwithstanding its success in
monkeys, as human reaction times (RTs)
are more asymmetrical than RTs distri-
butions observed in monkeys, traditional
diffusion models suit better the human
data. Thus, it is still open to further inves-
tigation whether the phenomenon is due
to the fact that human subjects are less
trained than monkeys or because humans
may use other cues to evaluate the sensory
reliability, not allowing for adaptive sen-
sory gain as, from the beginning, near the
optimal value are already achieved.
Osman (2012) empirically com-
pares Choice-based decision making and
Prediction-based learning, showing that
the former leads to more accurate cue-
outcome knowledge. The study mainly
focuses on the role of reward. During
training period, participants received
outcome feedback and were exposed to
different types of reward manipulations:
Positive Reward, Negative Reward, Both
Positive + Negative Reward, No Reward.
Negative Reward detrimentally affected
Choice-based decision making during
learning. By its turn, predictive-based
decision making was also negatively
affected by Positive Reward. During
test period, solely choice was negatively
affected by the previously Positive Reward
or Negative Reward manipulations exerted
in the training period. Based on those
results, author suggests that the addi-
tional demand of cognitive resources for
the processing of rewards could be an
explanation of its adverse effect in the
decisional process. Also, a series of philo-
sophical considerations is forwarded to
question how generalizable is evidence
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from neuropsychology to psychology and
vice-versa. In this context, the relationship
of intra-level and inter-level experiments
is considered.
In the Reviews’ section we have a
very innovative article by Nakao et al.
(2012). This meta-analytical manuscript
compares and disentangles two types of
empirical protocols used for study of
decisional processes: experiments with a
unique but uncertain answer and experi-
ments in which no unique external cued
answer could be considered correct. The
former is categorized as externally ori-
ented decision making and the latter as
internally oriented decision-making. The
article compares externally and inter-
nally guided decision-making empirically
and theoretically, studying conceptual and
operational differences, as also, similari-
ties between both cases. In the case of
externally guided decision, two types of
experiments are analyzed: tasks with diffi-
cult probabilistic outcome and also exper-
iments in which the answer is varied
(or believed to be varied). Both proto-
cols addressing neuroeconomic and social
subjects are included in this category. In
the case of internally guided decision-
making, experiments addressing prefer-
ence judgment andmoral decision making
are encompassed. The article uses Multi-
Kernel Density Analysis (MKDA) to con-
trast internally and externally guided deci-
sions in terms of recruitment of areas, to
finally compare commonalities and differ-
ences between the two types of decisions.
The authors show that externally guided
decision-making was mainly correlated to
the DLPFC-insula-thalamus-IPL network
and internally guided decision-making
to the VMPFC-pACC-PCC-STG network.
Also, it discusses possible future directions
to internally guided decision study. Along
the contributions to the field of decision
making, the article has as one its virtues a
contribution to the understanding brain’s
resting state and its high activity, especially
in the Default Mode Network (DMN) that
largely overlaps with observed regions in
internally guided decision-making.
IN THE PERSPECTIVES SECTIONWE
HAVE 3 CHAPTERS
Heinzelmann et al. (2012) discusses
the practical and moral question of
inappropriate behavior considering its
foundations in both philosophical nor-
mative and descriptive domains. The
moral implication of empirical findings
in neuroscience, economics and psychol-
ogy are discussed in the light of this
philosophical background aiming at an
understanding of the possible mechanisms
of moral inappropriate actions and the
decisional process that leads to them.
More importantly, the paper addresses
the morally important and controver-
sial question of interventions to promote
behavior improvement. First, it consid-
ers the empirical available knowledge
on different techniques of interventions
to promote better decisional capacities
at various levels of invasiveness: nudg-
ing, training, education, pharmacological
enhancement and tDCS/TMS. Then, it
discusses its feasibility and whether or
not we can be morally justifiable to apply
those techniques. Both practical and foun-
dational issues are considered to answer
this question.
Taking as a standpoint Stephens and
Anderson’s (2001) already classic arti-
cle, by Bourgeois-Gironde (2012) aims
at considering the viability of method-
ological transfers from behavioral ecol-
ogy to experimental economics, includ-
ing human choice inasmuch as it is con-
cerned with intertemporal preferences.
The author suggests that economic theo-
ries have noticeable similarities to ecologi-
cal models in their assumptions and impli-
cations. More specifically, it is argued that
“hyperbolic time discounting” is present
in both humans and other animals, despite
the possibility of this process being not
only quantitatively but also qualitatively
highly different among species. Brief evo-
lutionary considerations are offered to
contend for this possibility.
Lucci (2013) proposes an investiga-
tion of the subjective component of time
in intertemporal choice (IC). The author
asserts that deviations from exponential
reward discounting, as a function of time,
could have as a primary factor the devi-
ation of subjective time from the calen-
dar metric system time. Time perception,
she claims, could modulate discounting.
Consequently, time perception would be a
fundamental component of IC. Reviewing
recent literature on time perception, she
discusses its relationship with the measur-
ing of IC. Her approach emphasizes the
importance of the self in the explanation
of behavior from a temporal perspective.
IN THE HYPOTHESES AND THEORIES
AXIS 3 CHAPTERS ARE PRESENTED
Smaldino and Richerson (2012)
approached a very important founda-
tional question, namely, the generations
of options. The authors argue that current
paradigms in neuroscience are focused
on decisions made among a previously
established set of options, although, the
very generation of options has barely
been studied and still to a great extent an
untapped issue. The author considers vari-
ous specific factors that could influence the
generation of options that would be cate-
gorizable in two broadly defined domains:
psycho-biological and socio-cultural.
Volz and Gigerenzer (2003) differen-
tiate the “small world” of risk from the
“large worlds” of uncertainty. Authors
argue that normative strategies used in
decisions under risk could not be gen-
eralized to all types of decision-making
processes, stressing that in most of the
experimental designs, the strategies to deal
with risk are assumed as implicit presup-
positions even if they are not applicable.
Also, it is shown that criteria for generating
optimal solutions in decisional processes
under risk could not be the best whenever
uncertainty is the difficulty the agents have
to cope with. Even the neural correlates of
decision under uncertainty would be dif-
ferent from the ones present in decision
under uncertainty. More precisely, value-
based statistical thinking would be suffi-
cient for making good decisions in a risk
situation but not in the case of uncer-
tainty. Under uncertainty, heuristic think-
ing would play a key role in an efficient
decisional process.
Shadlen and Roskies (2012) argue for
the possibility of reconciling responsibil-
ity with neurobiology and mechanism
by philosophically reviewing presupposi-
tions and implications of recent empiri-
cal studies in neurobiology. Instead of the
more traditional account of compatibilism
based on an appeal to randomness or noise
as a source of freedom, they rather recog-
nize that randomness could possibly estab-
lish the background against which policies
have to be adopted. Although, the argu-
ment does not favor compatibility of free-
dom with determinism per se, it contends
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that compatibilism of responsibility and
mechanism is possible. Their arguments
function in hypothetical manner: if agents
can be accountable for policies that in
some sense determine decisions, they can
be held responsible for those decisions,
even if they do not have conscious access
to the reasons for those decisions.
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